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Introduction 
A rigorous set of detailed ground safety requirements is required to make sure 
that ground support equipment (GSE) and associated planned ground operations 
are conducted safely. Detailed ground safety requirements supplement the GSE 
requirements already called out in NASA-STD-5005. 
This paper will describe the initial genesis of these ground safety requirements, 
the establishment and approval process and finally the implementation process 
for Project Orion. The future of the requirements will also be described. 
Problems and issues encountered and overcame will be discussed. 
Overview of Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Abort Fli ght Test (AFT) Proiect 
The AFT project is designed to demonstrate the capabilities of the Launch Abort 
System (LAS), through a series of full scale flight tests. The purpose of the LAS 
is to save the crew should a contingency situation occur on the launch pad (pad 
abort) or during early phases of ascent (ascent abort). A launch escape system 
has been used once before to save a Russian crew from a launch pad 
conflagration. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) AFT plan is to conduct two 
pad abort tests (Pad Abort (PA)-1 and PA-2) and three ascent abort (Ascent 
Abort (AA)-1, AA-2 and AA-3) tests. The three ascent tests will initiate aborts at 
the maximum dynamic pressure condition and two aborts will be initiated at a 
transonic condition - one nominal attitude and one off-nominal attitude. The test 
conditions for the ascent abort tests will be attained by utilizing a booster motor 
that will loft the Crew Module (CM)/LAS to the desired LAS abort initiation test 
point. Per the current schedule, PA-1 is to launch first followed by AA-I, PA-2, 
AA-2 and AA-3, respectively. The results of these engineering demonstration 
tests will be used to build confidence in the LAS and CM designs. Results from 
these flight tests support hardware certification efforts from the standpoint that 
the data can be used to anchor critical CEV analytical models. The LAS, while 
considered as an emergency use system is, nonetheless, critical in mitigating the 
overall Loss Of Crew (LOC) risk for the Constellation Program. Early on, in 
preparation for the equivalent of System Requirements Review (SRR) for PA-1, a 
set of flight test objectives were generated. These test objectives are 
documented in CxP 72216, "Project Orion Flight Test Vehicle Mission and Flight 
Test Objectives". As the Project learns more, these test objectives have been 
and will be updated to get the most out of these expensive, but high value, flight 
tests. 
Due to the need to test the LAS design early, before production CMs were 
available, unique arrangements were struck between the NASA design and 
operations centers and Lockheed Martin (LM), the prime contractor for the CM,
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Service Module (SM), and LAS. For the first two flight tests structurally similar 
CM5 (same Outer Mold Line (OML) as the production vehicle) are to be built by 
NASA Langley Research Center. Also, for the first two test flights, the LM-
provided LAS are to be "production like", with some notable differences. The LM-
provided avionics, which control CM and LAS event functions during the test, is 
also "production like" (commensurate with the maturity of these systems). NASA 
Johnson Space Center provides the CEV Parachute Assembly System (CPAS), 
NASA Standard Initiators (NSI5), and the frangible nuts that provide the structural 
attachment between the LAS and the CM. Finally, NASA Dryden Flight 
Research Center (DFRC) provides the Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
(DFI) system and instrumentation to obtain the important flight test data. All of 
this new flight hardware requires the design and procurement of literally 
hundreds of pieces of Ground Support Equipment (GSE) (provided by NASA and 
LM) as well as the development of new operational procedures to perform the 
necessary ground operations. Furthermore, ground operations are to occur at 
two primary locations - DFRC and WSMR. Much of the low hazard flight test 
article build-up is to occur at DFRC while the hazardous operations, including 
build-up of the LAS (three solid rocket motors) and installation of mortars and 
pyrotechnics is to occur at WSMR. 
The task of integrating all of this together was truly complex and the desire to do 
things similarly was important. Also, there existed a consideration that some of 
the GSE that was being built to support the abort flight test program might 
eventually be utilized in support of production vehicle build-up or during ground 
processing flows. Therefore the desire to build this equipment right the first time 
was certainly a financial consideration. Finally, a number of different safety 
cultures existed, with specific experiences and knowledge base that also had to 
be fully integrated. The U.S. Army safety personnel that were assigned to 
support the abort flight test program at WSMR informed NASA that the GSE 
hardware and associated hazardous operations needed to be controlled by a 
strict set of safety requirements. The Army was receptive to a uniquely tailored 
set of ground safety requirements developed by NASA in lieu of imposing Air 
Force Space Command Manual (AFSCMAN) 91-710, which is the all 
encompassing set of ground safety requirements typically imposed by the military 
for their projects. This inter-agency arrangement required the approval of these 
safety requirements by the WSMR base commander. 
Establishment of Need 
In April 2007, during PA-1 Project Technical Review-2 (PTR-2) (equivalent to a 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR), in terms of design maturity), an action was 
issued by the Project Orion Project Technical Review (PTR) Technical Review 
Team (TRT) (evaluation board) to establish a tailored set of ground safety 
requirements to be used for CEV Abort Flight Testing. These requirements were 
to be flowed down to GSE, the flight test articles, and ground operations. The 
need for these requirements was driven by the project's plan to conduct testing at
NASA's Dryden Flight Test Center and the U.S. Army's White Sands Missile 
Range (WSMR). WSMR required that a rigorous set of ground safety 
requirements be established to ensure the safe conduct of ground operations on 
the Range. As might be expected the various design teams, spread across the 
USA, that were already well into their design activities were concerned about 
how these safety requirements might impact their development efforts. 
The abort flight test safety team, which was assigned to tackle this problem, was 
a partnership between safety personnel from a number of NASA centers and the 
prime contractor for Orion, Lockheed-Martin. Since NASA DFRC was an 
aeronautical flight test center having little experience with solid rocket motors and 
NASA JSC was primarily a flight center it was obvious that for this effort to 
succeed the team needed expertise from NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 
NASA's primary center for spaceflight ground operations. NASA KSC ground 
safety experts officially joined the CEV abort flight test safety team in March 
2007. With this addition the safety team had sufficiently diverse expertise to 
tackle the problem. From late May through early July 2007, the abort flight test 
safety group underwent an intense effort to generate a tailored set of ground 
safety requirements for the CEV abort flight test project. The methodology and 
approach taken by this safety group will be discussed in detail in another section 
of this paper. In July 2007, these safety requirements were mature enough to be 
flowed down to the various elements and potential design impacts were rectified. 
In October 2007, the Orion Project officially approved these requirements for use 
on the CEV abort flight test project and the WSMR base commander approved 
the document for use at WSMR several months later. The document was given 
the number and title, CxP 72213, "Project Orion Ground Safety Design and 
Operational Requirements." This was the first set of safety requirements to be 
established for Project Orion. Somewhat surprisingly, many of the design, 
operations, and management personnel actually found these requirements to be 
helpful to them as the design and operations activities continued to mature. It 
was not unusual to see this document quoted during design and operations 
presentations in support of some of the decisions that were being made. 
During the development of CxP 72213, the CEV abort flight test safety team 
consulted a large number of technical experts to ensure the best set of safety 
requirements possible. The safety team would be remiss to not thank the myriad 
of experts that contributed their expertise to this effort. 
Identification of Source Documents 
A decision was made early in the process to use existing NASA ground safety 
documents as the basis for the CxP. KSC has a long history with ground safety 
for both manned and unmanned vehicles and payloads. The primary documents 
used were Kennedy Hand Book (KHB) 1700.7, "Space Shuttle Payload Ground 
Safety Handbook" and Kennedy NASA Procedures and Requirements (KNPR) 
8715.3, "KSC Safety Practices Procedural Requirements". In addition,
AFSCMAN 91-710, other subject matter experts and the team's personal 
experiences were used to fill in known gaps in the basic source documents 
related to unique AFT issues. 
What made KHB 1700.7 such a particularly good book to serve as a basis for 
ground safety was its long history of use and the fact that the document was 
originally developed as a joint use book by the NASA and United States Air 
Force (USAF) launch sites. This "jointness" was important in obtaining WSMR 
concurrence with the AFT project developing its own set of requirements. The 
KHB primarily brought a set of safety design requirements to the process. 
However, the KHB did have its weaknesses. The two biggest areas were 
graphite-epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) and 
batteries, especially lithium based. Both of these areas have been very dynamic 
in recent years. Consulting the subject matter experts in these fields resulted in 
up to date requirements for COPVs and batteries. Other minor deficiencies were 
also updated based on the personal experiences of the team. 
The other important contributor to the CxP was KNPR 8715.3. This KSC 
document also had a long history of use, capturing lessons learned as far back 
as the Apollo Program and up to the present time. What distinguishes the KNPR 
from the KHB is that it is primarily a set of operational requirements. Where the 
two documents overlapped, the more stringent requirement was adopted. 
By using these existing documents the team was able to, in less than six months, 
put together a comprehensive set of ground safety documents unique to Project 
Orion. 
Pulling It All Together 
To accomplish this process, a team of experts, NASA, Army and Contractor, was 
drawn together to sift through the source documents, draw out the applicable 
requirements, identify any gaps, fill those gaps and publish a single document for 
use. Several face to face meetings were held as well as numerous telephone 
conferences. Knowing the difficult task ahead, the team jelled quickly, thus 
meeting the quick turnaround time needed to get these requirements in the 
hands of GSE and Flight Hardware developers. Gaining approval from WSMR 
was also critical, for with WSMR approval, the Project would have be required to 
comply with the very detailed requirements of AFSPMAN 91-710. 
Also participating in the development were representatives of the Project Office. 
While not safety experts, they assisted the Team in tightening up the 
requirements by questioning how each shall statement (i.e. requirement) needed 
to be verified. This give and take helped establish a good set of requirements. 
And at the end of the process, both the safety and Project Office representatives 
were both still talking to each other.
However, in spite of a Team's best efforts, no document is perfect. It can only be 
a first approximation at best. This was discovered when the document was 
released for review within the Project and supporting organizations. A vast 
majority of comments received pointed out deficiencies that were obvious in 
hindsight. The value of outside reviewers was amply demonstrated. Again, 
these personnel enhanced the validity of the document. As is usually the case, 
some compromises were made in order to gain approval. These compromises 
were mostly in the area of the Scope of the document. Technical compromises 
were based in sound reasoning. 
The CxP 72213 is truly a living document. With each day, new interpretations 
are needed based on the lessons being earned in first time operations. At the 
present time (Fall 2008), the document is undergoing its third revision. This is 
not a bad thing; but rather demonstrates continuous improvement is at work. 
Issuina and lmDlementin 
Once the document was written and reviewed for comments, it was presented to 
Project Orion Management for approval. As previously mentioned, the primary 
sticking point in final approval was how to scope the document. The original 
version of the document had been written at a Project level; that is, for use from 
production through all testing and processing leading up to a crewed launch. 
However, there were many strenuous objections to this broad of scope. When 
brought before the Project Orion Manager at the Project Control Board, a 
compromise was worked out that kept the overall tone of the document at the 
Project but limited its initial scope to the AFT project only. This compromise 
allowed for broadening of the scope at a future date, if so desired. 
With this approval, the document was presented to the WSMR safety community. 
Upon their review, they endorsed the document and presented to the WSMR 
Commander, who also agreed that the document was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the Range. This was an important milestone as it gave the AFT 
Project the confidence to proceed. 
Implementation has been mildly difficult. This has been the result of the 
compressed schedule of the Project relative to having its requirements in place. 
It seemed as if the safety community was always running to catch up. Adding to 
the difficulty was the training of personnel to work with a set of definitive safety 
requirements. This only fix to this situation has been time. As the operations 
and safety communities work out each issue, the overall process becomes more 
stable, thereby decreasing the risk. This is important as the Project moves 
towards live testing at WSMR. 
Lessons Learned 
The following is a summary of the lessons learned from this effort.
Any Team developing requirements must think ahead. They must know what the 
final goal is. Without this vision, it is very easy to get bogged down in the minutia 
of day-to-day operations or locations. Requirements should be written at a high 
enough level to applicable across the program, without being so general as to be 
meaningless. Specific implementation of requirements should be left to lower 
level documents. 
Although Project Orion is a "new" project, very little of the Project is so new as to 
need never before established requirements. Although existing requirements 
from other programs should be thoroughly reviewed, the simple fact they come 
from another program does not make them non applicable. Accept history as the 
basis for going forward. 
Imposing safety requirements is a love/hate relationship. Projects do not 
inherently and deliberately design hardware to fail or be unsafe. Therefore there 
is a natural resistance to imposing new design and operational safety• 
requirements especially after the requirement development period of the design 
cycle is over. However, by generating a good set of safety requirements the 
safety team is actually helping the design and operations teams to resolve issues 
within their areas. As a result they will thank you later (well maybe). 
"One stop shopping" for safety requirements (i.e. all ground safety requirements 
compounded into one document) is not always the project mantra. Engineers 
prefer to have safety requirements that drive their design imbedded in their 
controlled design documentation. On the other hand, safety professionals, 
including independent review authorities (such as safety panel personnel), prefer 
having the safety requirements in a singular document under their control. 
Project management does not want requirements duplicated in multiple project-
level controlled documents. The solution to this dilemma is not clear. For Project 
Orion, while the safety community has been relatively successful in keeping the 
ground safety requirements in one document; the flight safety requirements have 
been a different matter. 
When working in the early stages of a testing program, it is important to be as 
flexible as possible in interpreting/enforcing the requirements. However, 
although flexibility is necessary, a firm line must be established to assure 
compliance. This is a difficult tightrope and can cause a considerable amount of 
stress. 
As discussed above, the scope of the document is critical. Once the scope is 
agreed to, every effort must be made to ensure all the involved parties or 
stakeholders recognize the document. If not, it is highly likely GSE will show up 
that does not meet the requirements.
Finally, it is important to know the obstacles in the path to success. Recognizing 
these obstacles allows the Project to determine when to be flexible and when to 
be firm. 
Summary 
In spite of a very compressed schedule, Project Orion's AFT safety team was 
able to pull together a comprehensive set of ground safety requirements using 
existing requirements and subject matter experts. These requirements will serve 
as the basis for the design of GSE and ground operations. Using the above 
lessons learned as a roadmap, new Projects can produce the same results.
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